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What’s NASA Doing Now
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“It can only be attributable to human error.“
-- HAL 9000 (2001: A Space Odyssey)
Words of Wisdom
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NASA Risk and Safety Culture
• NASA’s Mishaps
– Notable Losses in Space and on the Ground. 
– The Impact of Human Factors on Mishaps.
• NASA’s Risk Management Practices
– Learning how to identify “Smart Risks”.
– Risk Policy and Processes.
– Facility Risk Control and Assessment.
• NASA’s Safety Culture 
– Reducing error by cultivating skill-based behavior.
– Bolstering trust throughout operations.
– Measuring safety culture growth.
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Recent Mission Mishaps
NASA’s Losses
Columbia STS-107, February 1, 2003:
• 7 fatalities; 
• $3 Billion vehicle loss;
• 2.5 year mission impact. 
NOAA N-Prime, 
September 6, 
2003:
• $135 Million 
vehicle damage;
• 5.5 year mission 
impact. 
Soyuz MS-10, October 11, 2018:
• Aborted ascent of ISS Expedition 57;
• Crew shift delay threat to continuing ISS 
operations 
Extra-Vehicular Activity 
(EVA) 23 Water Intrusion, 
July, 16, 2013:
• Water collecting inside 
EMU helmet posed 
threat of drowning. 
OCO, February  24, 2009:
• $280 Million vehicle loss;
• 5+ year mission impact. 
Glory,  March 
4, 2011:
• $424 Million 
vehicle loss;
• Additional 
$467 million 
mission 
impact. 
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NASA’s Losses
MSFC Freedom Star Tow-wire Injury, December 12, 2006
• Hospitalization due to internal injuries from impact with SRB 
tow-wire.
Location Where Employee 
Fell From Roof
Second Point of 
Impact of Deceased
First Point of Impact of 
Deceased
KSC Roofing 
Fatality, March 17, 
2006
• Subcontractor 
died from head 
injuries suffered 
due to fall.
JSC Chamber B 
Asphyxiation, 
July 28, 2010
• Shoulder 
injury due to 
asphyxiation 
and fall.
Recent Institutional Mishaps
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WFF CNC Injury, 
October 28, 2010
• Sub-dermal 
tissue damage 
due to impact 
from machine 
tool shrapnel.
JSC Custodial Fatality, January 
25, 2014
• Contract employee died 2 days 
after suffering a fall while 
collecting trash.
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What is the impact of Human Factors?
• Estimates range from 65-90% of catastrophic mishaps are due 
to human error.
– NASA’s human factors-related mishaps causes are estimated at ~75%
• As much as we’d like to error-proof our work environment, 
even the most automated and complex technical endeavors 
require human interaction…and are vulnerable to human 
frailty.
• Industry and government are focusing not only on human 
factors integration into hazardous work environments, but 
also looking for practical approaches to cultivating a strong 
Safety Culture that diminishes risk.   
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Some Risk Management Philosophy…
As much as we’d like to be able to predict error, the reality is that we must 
measure known performance characteristics to identify vulnerabilities, 
mitigate greatest risk, and enable prudent response to the next accident.
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High Risk Occupations vs. Space Flight
Shuttle Astronaut
Northeast Multispecies 
Groundfish Fishing
Alaskan Commercial Fishing
Commercial Fishing
Extraction –
Mining, Oil and Gas
Construction Worker
Alaskan Commuter Pilot
Airline Pilot
Timber Cutting and Logging
Truck Driver
0 1:100 1:50 1:33
Probability
1:218
1:166
1:775
1:851
1:4420
1:4190
1:336
1:1270
1:998
1:3790
Person-Fatality Risk Per Year 
Risk increases as “drill down” into smaller and 
smaller groups that drive the risk.  
Shuttle Astronaut risk is a very small group that 
has high risk.
Miner risk does not include fatalities due to chronic 
illnesses like “black lung.” 
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1:70Mt. Everest Climber
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Risk Tolerance & Failing Smart
NASA is known for Gene Kranz’s
famous quote,
“Failure is not an option.”  
It is not an option anyone chooses, 
but it is a reality we must confront.
November 28, 2018
How to identify a smart risk….
• Can we afford the consequence of failure?  
• Can we learn from the mistake?  
• Can we get back up and try again? 
• Do we own the risk in the first place? 
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Risk Informed Decision-Making 
(RIDM)* involves: 
(1) Identification of decision alternatives, 
recognizing opportunities where they 
arise, and considering a sufficient 
number and diversity of performance 
measures to constitute a 
comprehensive set for decision-making 
purposes.
(2) Risk analysis of decision alternatives 
to support ranking.
(3) Selection of a decision alternative 
informed by (not solely based on) risk 
analysis results.
NASA’s Risk Assessment Concepts & Requirements
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* NPR 8000.4, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements 
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3 x 4 p Test system maintenance ## 3 2 2 4 4 2
4 x 5 p Mission essential resource limitations ## 4 4 5 2 1 4
4 x 3 p Equipment End-of-Life ## 4 3 1 1 3
4 x 3 p Building Refurbishments ## 4 3 3 1 1 2
5 x 5 p Comm Systems End-of-Life ## 5 5 4 3 5 5
4 x 4 p Building Maintenance Shortfall ## 4 3 3 4 2 2
3 x 4 p Asbestos abatement ## 3 2 3 2 4 3
4 x 4 p Core Capability Threat ## 4 4 3 1 4
4 x 4 p Water System-Repairs/Upgrades ## 4 4 4 4 2 3
5 x 4 r Research equipment failure threat ## 5 4 4 4
Legend
p Top Center Risk (TCR)
r Proposed Top Center Risk (Proposed 
TCR)
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• Risk management forums are active for individual programs and the 
institution, but risk assessment criteria is consistent.  
• Though program and institutional operating budgets are separate, risks are 
cross-communicated to identify potential impacts.
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Process Measures for High-Risk Facilities
• Industry and government organizations have recognized the value of monitoring leading indicators 
to identify potential risk vulnerabilities.
• NASA has adapted this approach to assess risk controls associated with hazardous, critical, and 
complex facilities.
• NASA’s facility risk assessments integrate commercial loss control, OSHA Process Safety, API 
Performance Indicator Standard, and NASA Operational Readiness Inspection concepts to identify 
risk control vulnerabilities. 
November 28, 2018
Examples of leading 
measure areas for high-risk 
facilities include:
 Maintenance and system 
integrity conditions;
 Operational qualifications;
 Challenges to safety systems 
and monitoring equipment;
 Communication and reporting 
system conditions;
 Accuracy of configuration 
management;
 Maintenance of operational 
procedures and emergency 
response plans. 
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Not 
Applicable
Elements of 
assessment are 
not applicable to 
the associated 
facility mission.
HATS Closed:
Conforms
Items identified as 
nonconforming 
were resolved.
* Non-
conformance
Documentation 
does not exist to 
support the 
checklist 
requirements.  
Partially 
conforms
Significant 
information is 
available, but 
does not meet the 
intent of risk 
control, or it is out 
of date or 
unavailable.  
Conforms
Documentation is 
available with the 
required 
information to 
meet checklist 
intent.
Ellington
Field
Mission
Operations
Engineering CODIRD
Assessment 
Characteristic Key
SA KA
OA
NS
Building/Facility identifications
Facility Safety Risk Monitoring
Assessment Characteristic Status
* A nonconformance is tracked until closure.  
Partial nonconformances represent opportunities 
for risk reduction but are not followed up until 
the next scheduled assessment. David T. Loyd 15
Minimizing Human Error 
and Cultivating a Reduced Risk Environment 
Rasmussen’s 3 Human Responses to Operator Information Processing 
1. Skill-based: requires little or no cognitive effort.
2. Rule-based: driven by procedures or rules.
3. Knowledge-based: requires problem solving/decision making.
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“The fewer rules a coach has, the fewer 
rules there are for players to break.”
John Madden 
“Successful design is not the 
achievement of perfection but the 
minimization and accommodation of 
imperfection.” 
Henry Petroski
Photo accessed under “Fair Use” 
provisions.
Photo accessed under “Fair Use” 
provisions.
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ISSUE RESOLUTION FORUMS
• Trust is what drives open reporting. 
• Transparent dialog promotes availability of information to 
inform more robust decision-making.
• The result is uniform engagement to optimize success 
potential and accept a common risk tolerance (resilience). 
• This environment is the foundation of an effective safety 
culture  
Trust and Transparency Builds Common Risk Tolerance
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How Safety Culture Promotes Operational Excellence
• By advocating a pervasive Safety Culture, we can 
provide our workforce with:
– Clear emphasis on continuous learning;
– Encouragement to develop intuitive personal values;
– Guidelines for decision-making behavior that focuses on 
long-term success;
– Reinforcement to build trust by reporting and 
communicating concerns and ideas.
• Practicing an effective Safety Culture: 
– Builds Skill-based and Knowledge-based response 
mechanisms;
– Reduces the emphasis on Rule-based response; 
– And breaks down barriers to Trust. 
November 28, 2018 David T. Loyd |18
NASA’s Safety/Risk Culture Model
“An environment characterized by safe attitudes and 
behaviors modeled by leaders and embraced by all that 
fosters an atmosphere of open communication, mutual 
trust, shared safety values and lessons, and confidence 
that we will balance challenges and risks consistent with 
our core value of safety to successfully accomplish our 
mission.”
An effective safety culture is characterized by the following 
subcomponents:
Culture - We report our concerns
Culture - We have a sense of fairness
Culture - We change to meet new demands
Culture - We learn from our successes and mistakes
Culture - Everyone does his or her part 
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Catastrophic Event Impact
Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA’s History
Reporting – With both tragedies, launch process deficiencies, such as O-ring 
susceptibility in cold temperatures (Challenger) and foam shedding (Columbia), 
were passively reported problems, yet were not considered serious hazards.
Just – Some engineers were reluctant to raise concerns when faced with a return of 
an “in God we trust - all others bring data” attitude.  
Flexible – With both incidents, the Shuttle Program was experiencing schedule 
pressure challenges. 
Learning – With “normalization of deviance,” O-ring burn-through and foam impact 
had become classified as “in-family” and as a negligible risk.
Engaged – NASA management lacked involvement in critical discussions. 
November 28, 2018
Columbia – February 1, 2003
Challenger – January 28, 1986
David T. Loyd |20
Catastrophic Event Impact
Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA’s History
Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) 23 Water 
Intrusion – July 16, 2013
Reporting – Previous reports of EMU Suit leakage 
had been attributed to drink-bag leakage.  Reporting 
and investigating subsequent leakage was perceived 
of limited value.
Just – In addressing on-orbit anomalies, there was  
uncertainty between the defined roles and 
responsibilities of each of the organizations that 
participate in real-time operations. 
Flexible – Extensions in EMU maintenance frequency 
led to more cumbersome EMU hardware repair, 
constraining flexibility in responding to EMU-related 
anomalies.
Learning – Attrition had depleted knowledge of EMU 
suit legacy, lessons, and inherent limitations. 
Engaged – Throughout the EVA 23 activity and 
associated anomaly investigation, engagement was 
exceptional. 
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Deepwater Horizon – April 20, 2010
Reporting – Procedures were subjected to last-minute 
distribution, last minute decision.
Just – Concerns of rig workers regarding test results 
were muted, not heeded or explored .
Flexible – All involved seemed prepared to exercise 
flexibility, but this may be indicative of insufficient 
process discipline.
Learning – Invalid confidence in new slurry, vents from 
Mud-Gas Separator (MGS) allowed gas to enter rig 
spaces, insufficient planning for contingencies.
Engaged – Incorrect reading of pressure tests, lack of 
recognition or timely control action related to kicks, 
diverted flow through MGS instead of overboard,  
reluctance to activate Blow-Out Preventer (BOP), 
reluctance to activate the Emergency Disconnect 
System, BOP testing and maintenance.
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NASA Safety Culture Model Applied to Deepwater Horizon
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Measuring Safety Culture
2015 Safety Culture Survey Results
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HOT
“Eliminate the recalcitrant 
dinosaur dictators”
WARM
“Emphasis on purpose of 
safety measures, not just 
filling out a form or 
checking a box.”
TEPID
“Watch out for everyone” 
“Communication”
COOL
“Keep doing what you 
are doing. We are 
constantly being 
reminded of Safety and 
its importance.”
Comment Temperature Perspectives
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Reducing Risk Vulnerabilities
• NASA, like the other hazardous industries, 
has suffered very catastrophic losses.
• Human error will likely never be completely 
eliminated as a factor in our failures.
• Acknowledging human frailty and the 
potential for failure bolsters our ability to 
manage risks and mitigate the worst 
consequences.
• Building an effective Safety Culture bolsters 
skill-based performance that minimizes risk 
and encourages operational excellence. 
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Columbia STS-107, February 1, 2003:
7 fatalities; 
$3 Billion vehicle loss;
2.5 year mission impact. 
Kalpana Chawla
Rick D. Husband
Laurel B. Clark
Ilan Ramon
Michael P. Anderson
David M. Brown
William C. McCool
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NOAA N-Prime, September 6, 2003:
• $135 Million vehicle damage;
• 5.5 year mission impact. November 28, 2018 David T. Loyd 27
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Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) 23 Water Intrusion, 
July, 16, 2013:
• Water collecting inside EMU helmet posed threat  
of drowning. 
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Orbiting Carbon Observatory, 
February  24, 2009:
• $280 Million vehicle loss;
• 5 year mission impact. 
Glory,  March 4, 2011:
• $424 Million vehicle loss;
• An additional $467 Million 
mission impact. 
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Failed booster 
separation
Soyuz MS-10, October 11, 2018:
• Aborted ascent of ISS 
Expedition 57;
• Crew shift delay threat to 
continuing ISS operations 
JSC Chamber B Asphyxiation,
July 28, 2010
• Shoulder injury due to 
asphyxiation and fall.
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